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NOTES AND COMMENTS
the damages are such as to be a penalty.9 Even though under such a
contract the dealer is not required to prove his actual damage,
10 it
would be safer to do so and to show that it was difficult to estimate the
amount accurately when the contract was drawn.
In the two cases now reported involving the enforcement of these
contracts, it has not been necessary for the courts to pass directly on the
main issues. In Larson Buick Co. v. Mosca"- the facts disclosed obvious
fraud and the resale had been enjoined before an innocent purchaser in-
tervened. In Schuler v. Dearing Chevrolet Co. 2 the purchaser's demur-
rer was sustained because the company's pleadings did not show that it
had been damaged. However, from an over-all survey it appears that
the first problem is whether such contracts will be recognized at all by
the courts, to which it is submitted that in light of the present situation
in the automobile business they are highly desirable. The second prob-
lem, notice to the third party who buys from the original purchaser,
can be met by a notation on the title where it must be transferred as
part of a sale or by recordation of the contract in states like North
Carolina which do not make this requirement.
The solution most advantageous to the dealer would be a repurchase
contract which had its liquidated damages secured by a non-negotiable
note and a recorded chattel mortgage. Since this note and mortgage
would take effect only in event of a breach, they cannot be attacked as
a promise to pay more than the regular purchase price for the car.
Such a contract would deter reselling for it is not likely that a "used
car" dealer would want a vehicle with a mortgage against it which
must be paid to perfect the title. It would also give the notice neces-
sary for the use of an equitable remedy and protect against a breach by
an insolvent person. The majority of states recognize comity for
recordation, therefore a chattel mortgage properly recorded would be
constructive notice to a purchaser outside the state.13
MARSHALL T. SPEARS, JR.
Constitutional Law-Declaratory Judgment-Remedy
in Federal Constitutional Cases
The basic accomplishment of proceeding by declaratory judgment
is "that it enables the point in dispute to be raised at the inception of
the controversy, before damage has been done by acting upon one's own
'McCoRmicK, DAMAGES §157 (1935); Pace v. Z'ellmer, 194 Iowa 516, 186
N. W. 420 (1922).
1" If the court took judicial notice of the prevailing situation with regard to
"used cars," the opposition's claim of penalty would be met; if not, the better pro-
cedure would be to show the situation to rebut the claim.
1179 N. Y. S. 2d 654 (Sup. Ct. 1948).
1276 Ga. App. 570, 46 S. E. 2d 611 (1948).
a' 10 Ams. JUR., Chattel Mortgages §21; see Note, 57 A. L. R. 702, 711 (1928).
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view of his rights .... 1 In the field of constitutional law this accom-
plishment has various facets:
1. Plaintiff can prevent uncertainty and insecurity in personal and
business transactions without waiting until the damage has been
done.
2
2. Plaintiff can proceed on his own initiative to obtain a declaration
of his constitutional rights.3
3. Plaintiff can avoid the dilemma of making a choice, based on his
judgment of constitutionality, either of complying with a statute
and its restrictions, which may be unconstitutional all the while,
or of refusing to obey the statute and thereby subjecting himself
to its penalties if it later proves to be constitutional.4
4. Plaintiff need seek no coercive relief in order to obtain an ad-
judication of his constitutional rights.5
5. Plaintiff can avoid circuity of action and multiple litigation in'
many cases by a single declaration of constitutionality. 6
6. Plaintiff can pursue his action to a speedier conclusion.7 '
7. Also, plaintiff sho'ld not have to show that there is impending
irreparable injury8 or that his remedy at law is inadequate.0
In view of the extensive and seemingly successful utilization of the
declaratory judgment in other jurisdictions,10 Congress passed the Fed-
eral Declaratory Judgments Act,"1 and apparently intended that .the
'BORCHARD, DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS 55 (2d ed. 1941).
"Under the present law you take a step in the dark and then turn on the
light to see if you stepped into a hole. Under the declaratory judgment law you
turn on the light and then take the step." Representative Ralph Gilbert in 69
CONG. REc. 2108 (1928).
3 "It is true that (the plaintiffs) might translate their claims into actions, and
await prosecutions, but that is precisely the dilemma from which (the declaratory
judgment) was designed to afford relief." Faulkner v. Keene, 85 N. H. 147, 155,
155 Atl. 195, 200 (1931).
""Either course was fraught with danger. To afford relief to parties in such
a situation is the very purpose of the Declaratory Judgments Act." Acme Finance
Co. v. Huse, 192 Wash. 96, 108, 73 Pac. 2d 341, 346 (1937).
'UNIFORM DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS ACT §1; 48 STAT. 955, 28 U. S. C. §400
(1934), as amended, 49 STAT. 1027 (1935), 28 U. S. C. §400 (1946).
'Socony-Vacuum Oil Co. v. City of New York, 287 N. Y. Supp. 288 (1936),
aff'd, 272 N. Y. 668, 5 N. E. 2d 385 (1936).
" "The court may order a speedy hearing of an action for declaratory judg-
ment and may advdnce it on the calendar." FED. R. Crv. P., 57.
8 Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry. v. Wallace, 288 U. S. 249 (1933) so held, but
later cases have indicated a tendency to the contrary as will be shown.
' "The existence of another adequate remedy does not preclude a judgment for
declaratory relief in cases where it is appropriate." FED. R. Civ. P., 57.
"°UNIFoRm DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS ACT is now adopted substantially in
thirty-two states; see also New Zealand Declaratory Judgments Act, 1908, 8 Edw.
VII, No. 220; Dill v. Hamilton, 137 Neb. 723, 291 N. W. 62 (1940) (statute
regulating religious activities) ; Edgerton v. Hood, 205 N. C. 816, 172 S. E. 481
(1934) (banking statute).
148 STAT. 955, 28 U. S. C. §400 (1934), as amended, 49 STAT. 1027 (1935),
28 U. S. C. §400 (1946).
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full advantage of this new procedure should inure to the benefit of
federal constitutional litigants.
12
But the federal judiciary has found difficulty envisaging the declara-
tory judgment as a proper remedy in many constitutional cases. Before
the Federal Declaratory Judgments Act was passed the Supreme Court
had apparently waged a campaign through its decisions to avert enact-
ment, by continued reference to the declaratory judgment as a mere
advisory opinion.' 3  A drastic change occurred in Nashville, C. & St.
L. Ry. v. Wallace,14 arising under the Tennessee Declaratory Judgments
Act, when the Court accepted as valid the distinction between an ad-
visory opinion and a declaration of constitutional rights in a real and
substantial controversy. However, a year later in 1934 the Court said,
"This court may not be called on to give advisory opinions or to pro-
nounce declaratory judgments."' 5  But later the Supreme Court in
Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth'6 held the Federal Declaratory Judg-
ments Act constitutional and declaratory relief appropriate where there
is an actual controversy, even though the litigant be in no position to
seek coercive relief and suffers no irreparable injury. However, since
the Haworth case it has become increasingly apparent that the federal
judiciary, in line with its earlier attitude, is still reluctant to grant
declaratory judgments as to constitutional issues.'
7
The reason most often advanced by the Supreme Court in denying
declarations of constitutionality is "no case or controversy," based on
the old conception of the declaratory judgment as a mere advisory opin-
ion. A labor union sued under a state declaratory judgment act for a
declaration that a statute regulating the union as to strikes and pickets,
and subjecting union officials to possible imprisonment if violated, was
unconstitutional. Held: that since the plaintiff had not violated the
statute, there was no justiciable controversy, no concrete factual basis
for a decision.' 8 The union and its officers were thereby forced to
violate statutory regulations in order to test the constitutionality of the
statute, subjecting themselves to fines and possible imprisonment.19
Similarly the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that
2 Sen. Rep. No. 1005, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 2, 3; H. R. Rep. No. 1264, 73d
Cong., 2d Sess. 2.
"Willing v. Chicago Auditorium Ass'n, 277 U. S. 274 (1928) ; Liberty Ware-
house Co. v. Grannis, 273 U. S. 70 (1927); Note, Declaratory Relief in the
Supreme Court, 45 HARv. L. REv. 1089 (1932).
24288 U. S. 249 (1933).
' Alabama v. Arizona, 291 U. S. 286, 291 (1934).
300 U. S. 277 (1937).
17 See Comment, Declaratory Judgments in. Federal Courts, 41 YALE L. J. 1195
(1932) in reply to Note, Declaratory Relief in the Supremne Court, 45 HARv. L.
REv. 1089 (1932).
" Alabama State Fed. of Labor v. McAdory, 325 U. S. 450 (1945). The effect
of a state court decision was used as a secondary basis for the decision.
" Contra: Dill v. Hamilton, 137 Neb. 723, 291 N. W. 62 (1940).
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there was no case or controversy where plaintiff sued for a declaration
that the Arizona Train Limit Law was unconstitutional, alleging that
penalties for violation would cost plaintiff $1,600 to $37,000 per day,
while losses in freight if it obeyed would amount to not less than
$300,000 per year.20 The court held that since there had been no viola-
tion, there was no controversy. The court failed to perceive that until
its constitutionality was declared, the statute was a real threat to plain-
tiff, leaving his legal and financial position in a state of suspension.
2
Even where the SEC sought to enforce the no-mail penalties for failure
to register under the Public Utilities Holding Company Act and de-
fendant asked by counterclaim for a declaratory judgment that the Act
was unconstitutional, it was held that defendant had no case or con-
troversy because it had not registered under the Act.22 Thus defendant
was compelled either to register under the Act in order to contest the
validity of any part thereof, or refuse to subject itself to rigorous con-
trols by registering and thereby lose United States mail privileges.23
One of the most flagrant violations of the spirit and intent of declaratory
judgment legislation is the case of United Public Workers v. MitchellA
where the Supreme Court held that civil service employees who desired
to participate in political activities forbidden under the Hatch Act had
no justiciable controversy as to the constitutionality of the Act until
they had actually violated the Act and thereby subjected themselves to
possible dismissal from governmental service with simultaneous loss of
seniority. Justice Douglas, dissenting in part, presented the more real-
istic viewpoint :2
"Declaratory relief is the singular remedy available here to pre-
serve the status quo while the constitutional rights of these appel-
lants to make these utterances and to engage in these activities
are determined. The threat against them is real not fanciful,
immediate not remote. The case is therefore an actual not a
hypothetical one."
It is submitted that each of the above cases involved justiciable con-
20 Southern Pac. Co. v. Conway, 115 F. 2d 746 (C. C. A. 9th 1940).
21 Contra: ". . the mere continued existence of article 88 under the color of
right and authority constitutes a continuing threat to collect, exact, and enforce
the tax." Socony-Vacuum Oil Co. v. City of New York, 287 N. Y. Supp. 288,
aff'd, 272 N. Y. 668, 5 N. E. 2d 385 (1936).
2 Electric Bond and Share Co. v. SEC, 303 U. S. 419 (1938). Even though
the suit was to enforce the no-mail penalties of the statute, the Court said of the
counterclaim, "It presents a variety of hypothetical controversies which may never
become real." Mr. justice McReynolds dissented without opinion.
2 But cf. Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U. S. 238 (1936) in which the more
limited injunction was granted, although the provision of the statute held to render
it unconstitutional was not even shown to be involved in plaintiff's case.
24330 U. S. 75 (1947); see Sunderland, A Modern Evolution in Remedial
Rights-The Declaratory Judgment, 16 MrcH. L. REV. 69 (1917).
22330 U. S. 75, 119 (1947).
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troversies well within the limits of the declaratory remedy. It is diffi-
cult to appraise these decisions without concluding that the test of
justiciability was more rigidly applied by the federal courts because the
remedy sought was declaratory judgment .
2
Increasingly apparent in Supreme Court decisions is a failure to dis-
tinguish the declaratory judgment from injunction. There seems to be
a concerted attempt by the Supreme Court to restrict the use of declara-
tory relief in constitutional cases to the area already covered by injunc-
tion, requiring irreparable injury with no other adequate remedy.
Although the declaratory judgment is closely related to equitable actions,
it is not exclusively an equitable remedy, but a remedy sui generis,
applicable in both law and equity.27  Under the Federal Rules, the avail-
ability of declaratory relief is by express provision iwt dependent on
the inadequacy of other remedy.2
Yet in two recent cases involving the constitutionality of statutes,
where declaratory judgment and injunction were jointly sought, the Court
based much of its reasoning in throwing out the declaratory judgment,
as well as the injunction, on adequacy of remedy at law.29 Such reason-
ing was applicable to the injunction only,3 0 the court overlooking the
fact that there are many instances in which declaratory relief is appro-
priate where the technical prerequisites for injunction are not found.31
The Supreme Court has in one instance misrepresented the import of
its former words as to the necessity for showing threatened irreparable
injury in a declaratory judgment action. In deciding in Nashville, C. &
S. L. Ry. v. Wallace that irreparable injury was not necessary, injunc-
tion not being involved, the Court said 32
"Thus the narrow question presented for determination is whether
the controversy before us, which would be justiciable in this
" See Note, 25 N. C. L. REV. 436 (1947).
" Grosse Pointe Shores v. Ayres, 254 Mich. 58, 235 N. W. 829 (1931);
BORCHARD, DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS 239 (2d ed. 1941).
2" See note 9 supra.
"Aircraft & Diesel Equipment Corp. v. Hirsch, 331 U. S. 752 (1947) (ex-
haustion of administrative remdedy was involved) ; Coffman v. Breeze Corp., 323
U. S. 316 (1945).
20 "We see no reason why the statute (declaratory judgment statute) should
not, we think it should, be given the prophylactic scope to which its language,
in the light of its purpose, extends, under its disputants as to whose right there
is actual controversy, may obtain a binding judicial declaration as to them, before
damage has actually been suffered, and without having to make the showing of
irreparable injury and the law's inadequacy required for the granting of ordinary
preventive relief in equity." Gully v. Interstate Natural Gas Co., 82 F. 2d 145,
149 (1936), cert. denied, 298 U. S. 688 (1936).
1 "Its (the declaratory judgment's) purpose is to obtain a judicial determina-
tion of legal relations that are uncertain and the subject of dispute, and to avoid
. ..occasions for injunctive relief." 3 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRAcTic:E §57.02 (1st ed.
1938) ; Borchard, Tlw Next Step Beyond Equit3-The Declaratory Action, 13
U. OF CHl. L. REv. 145 (1946).
.2288 U. S. 249, 262 (1933). [Italics added to quotation.]
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Court if presented in a suit for injunction, is any less so because
through a modified procedure (declaratory judgment) appellant
has been permitted to present it . . . without praying for an in-
junction or alleging that irreparable injury will result. .. ."
But in Colgrove v. Green, a 1946 case, one portion of this statement
was lifted from its context and quoted thus :3
".. . the test for determining whether a federal court has
authority to make a declaration ... is whether the controversy
'would be justiciable in this court if presented in suit for in-
junction.' . .."
Clearly this is a direct misrepresentation of the Nashville decision
which held no irreparable injury was necessary if only declaratory judg-
ment were sought. The same year of the Colegrove case, Justice Rut-
ledge dissented in Cook v. Fortson, feeling that both the Colegrove case
and the Cook case should be reheard together. He explained his reasons
in a footnote. 4
"It was to avoid the limitations resulting from the fact that in-
junctive or other immediately effective equitable relief could not be
given that relief by way of declaratory judgment was authorized
by Congress. This Court has not yet determined that declaratory
relief cannot be given beyond the boundaries fixed by the pre-
existing jurisdiction in equity ......
A 1948 decision of the Supreme Court indicates that the majority
of the Court now regard the declaratory judgment as an action requir-
ing the equity prerequisites, if not an actual action in equity.3 5
The Court has been confronted in many declaratory judgment cases
with adversative conditions more drastic than those in earlier cases
where the supposedly more restricted injunction was upheld,3 6 but has
failed to perceive in many instances the potentialities of the declaratory
-328 U. S. 549, 552 (1946). The opinion of the Court was supported by
only three Justices, Frankfurter, who wrote the opinion, Reed, and Burton. Jus-
tice Jackson took no part in the case. Justice Rutledge concurred only in result.
Justice Black dissented and was joined by Justices.Douglas and Murphy. [Italics
added.]
,329 U. S. 675, 677 (1946). However, the appeal was dismissed per curiam
over the opinion of Justice Rutledge.
" "But as we have seen, the Bank's grievance here is too remote and insub-
stantial, too speculative in nature, to justify an injunction against the Board of
Governors, and therefore equally inappropriate for a declaration of rights." Eccles
v. Peoples Bank of Lakewood Village, Cal., 68 Sup. Ct. 641 (1948). Justice Reed,
dissenting, with whom Justice Burton joined, felt that the case should be heard
on its merits, saying, "If governmental power is being unlawfully used to con-
strain respondent's operation of its business, respondent is entitled to protection
now." [Italics added.]
8 Compare three earlier injunction cases, where, although a statute was either
not yet applied to plaintiff or not yet even in force, the Court heard the cases on
their merits, saying that there was an actual controversy. Village of Euclid v.
Ambler Realty Co., 272 U. S. 365 (1926) ; Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U. S.
510 (1925); Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U. S. 197 (1923).
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judgment in allowing unconstitutional legislation to be quickly and
effectively contested before irretrievable loss has occurred. It is sub-
mitted that the Supreme Court could properly allow the declaratory
judgment a more liberal application in federal constitutional litigation,
consonant with its status and intended use, without being forced to
decide any hypothetical cases based on insufficient facts.
37
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Eminent Domain-Hydroelectric Adaptability as Element of Just
Compensation-Effect of Federal Power Act
The Constitutional provisions' for payment of "just compensation
'
for land taken by means of eminent domain proceedings have generally
been regarded as securing to the owner the market value of the land
considering its best possible future use, i.e., the price which would be
agreed upon at a voluntary sale between an owner willing to sell and
a purchaser willing to buy.2  This general rule is applied where dam
sites are condemned,3 but a complicating factor arises when the owner
claims the special adaptability of his land for hydroelectric development
as an element of value. This special adaptability has generally been
allowed as a factor to be considered where a reasonable possibility of
connection with the other required tracts has caused purchasers in the
open market to take hydroelectric possibilities into account, quite apart
from the needs of the condemnor.4 The tendency has been in the direc-
tion of a more strict application of this rule so as to eliminate any
consideration of dam site adaptability where it appears that combination
of the tracts by open market purchases is not reasonably probable. 5
""If the remedy through a declaratory judgment does not at least in part
fill the gap between law and equity there would be little purpose in enacting the
statutes providing for such procedure." Schaefer v. First Nat. Bank of Findlay,
134 Ohio St. 511, 518, 18 N. E. 2d 263, 267 (1938).
'U. S. CoNsT. AMEND. V; AMEND. XIV requires the states to provide just
compensation for private property taken. Most state constitutions have such a
provision. Lenhoff, Development of the Concept of Eninent Domain, 42 COL. L.
REv. 596 (1942) ; McKean, Constitutional Limitations Upon the Power of Eminent
Domain, 6 RocKy MT. L. REv. 16 (1933); Recent Cases, 7 U. oF CHI. L. REv.
166 (1939).
2 BAUER, ESSENTIALS OF THE LAW OF DAMAGES 427 (1919) ; FIELD, THE LAW
OF DAMAGES §846 (1876); II LEWIS, THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN IN THE
UNITED SA ATS §478 (2d ed. 1900); III SEDG-,WICK, DAMAGES §1171 (9th ed.
1920); IV SUTHERLAND, THE LAW OF DAMAGES §1064 (4th ed. 1916).
'See Note, 106 A. L. R. 955 (1937).
' McCandless v. United States, 298 U. S. 342 (1936), reversing 74 F. 2d 596
(C. C. A. 9th 1935); Ford Hydroelectric Co. v. Neely, 13 F. 2d 361 (C. C. A.
7th 1926), cert. denied, 273 U. S. 723 (1926) ; accord, Mississippi and Rum River
Boom Co. v. Patterson, 98 U. S. 403 (1878). See Notes, 124 A. L. R. 910 (1940),
106 A. L. R. 955 (1937) ; Note, 2 WASH. L. REv. 192 (1927).
5 Olson v. United States, 292 U. S. 246 (1934), affirming 67 F. 2d 24 (C. C. A.
8th 1933) ; accord, North Kansas City Development Co. v. Chicago B. & Q. R.
Co., 147 F. 2d 161 (C. C. A. 8th 1945), cert. denied, 325 U. S. 867 (1945);
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